With him on the briefs was Jeffrey B. Parsons. 1973. or benefit provided to others.4 All citizens may register, vote, and be represented. post, at 684-685 (dissenting opinion). Again, however, the equal protection inquiry should look at the group's overall influence over, and treatment by, elected representatives and the political process as a whole. JUSTICE SOUTER contends that exacting scrutiny of racial gerrymanders under the Fourteenth Amendment is inappropriate because reapportionment "nearly always require[s] some consideration of race for legitimate reasons." The fact that a demonstration of discriminatory effect was required in that case was not a function of the kind of claim that was made. This small sample only begins to scratch the surface of the problems raised by the majority's test. Because appellants here stated such a claim, the District Court erred in dismissing their complaint. In short, even assuming that racial (or political) factors were considered in the drawing of district boundaries, a showing of discriminatory effects is a "threshold requirement" in the absence of which there is no equal protection violation, id., at 143, and no need to "reach the question of the state interests served by the particular districts," id., at 142.4, To distinguish a claim that alleges that the redistricting scheme has discriminatory intent and effect from one that does not has nothing to do with dividing racial classifications between the "benign" and the malicious-an enterprise which, as the majority notes, the Court has treated with skepticism. See post, at 678 (dissenting opinion). It is evident to me, however, that what North Carolina did was precisely tailored to meet the objection of the Attorney General to its prior plan. On the same reasoning, I would affirm the District Court's dismissal of appellants' claim in this instance. See, e. g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S. 474, 484, n. 2 (1990) ("[A] prosecutor's assumption that a black juror may be presumed to be partial simply because he is black violates the Equal Protection. Nonetheless, the notion that North Carolina's plan, under which whites remain a voting majority in a disproportionate number of congressional districts, and pursuant to which the State has sent its first black representatives since Reconstruction to the United States Congress, might have violated appellants' constitutional rights is both a fiction and a departure from settled equal protection principles. the latter two of these three conditions depend on proving that what the Court today brands as "impermissible racial stereotypes," ante, at 647, are true. Argued April 20, 1993-Decided June 28,1993. Appellants' racial gerrymandering claims must be examined against the backdrop of this country's long history of racial discrimination in voting. The Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1870 after a bloody Civil War, promised unequivocally that "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote" no longer would be "denied or abridged by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." It rejected the argument that race-conscious redistricting to benefit minority voters is per se unconstitutional. 42 U. S. C. 1973(b). Regardless whether that description was accurate, see ante, at 645, it seriously deflates the precedential value which the majority seeks to ascribe to Gomillion: As I see it, the case cannot stand for the proposition that the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more, gives rise to an equal protection challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 144 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting). Evidence of the district's shape is therefore convincing, but it is also cumulative, and, for our purposes, irrelevant. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 4 The majority's use of "segregation" to describe the effect of districting here may suggest that it carries effects comparable to school segregation making it subject to like scrutiny. claim in UJO was that the State had "violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by deliberately revising its reapportionment plan along racial lines." That claim, the majority concluded, was barred by United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977) (UJO). Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976). Our focus is on appellants' claim that the State engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. We express no view as to whether appellants successfully could have challenged such a district under the Fourteenth Amendment. by Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Scott A. Sinder, Kevin X. Crowley, and James A. Peters. Croson, supra, at 500 (quoting Wygant, supra, at 277 (plurality opinion)). Location North Carolina General Assembly. In whatever district, the individual voter has a right to vote in each election, and the election will result in the voter's representation. Post, at 668 (WHITE, J., dissenting). See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448,524-525, n. 3 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("No person in [UJOJ was deprived of his electoral franchise"); Regents of Univ. The Court offers them no explanation of this paradox. By perpetuating stereotypical notions about members of the same racial group-that they think alike, share the same political interests, and prefer the same candidates-a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. 2 See Karcher, 462 U. S., at 748 (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("If they serve no purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that may occupy a position of strength at a particular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of, duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power over the electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group. Statement, O. T. 1991, No. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 144 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting). Wygant, supra, at 295 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). It spite of such criticisms, the redistricting accomplished its goal. If the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains uncontradicted, the District Court further must determine whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. If the company issues these new bonds at an annual coupon rate of 8%, they will sell at par. The grounds for my disagreement with the majority are simply stated: Appellants have not presented a cognizable claim, because they have not alleged a cognizable injury. by Herbert Wachtell, William H. Brown III, Thomas J. Henderson, Frank R. Parker, Brenda Wright, Nicholas DeB. Appellee Reno . In Gomillion, in short, the group that formed the majority at the state level purportedly set out to manipulate city boundaries in order to remove members of the minority, thereby denying them valuable municipal services. Because the General Assembly's reapportionment plan affected the covered counties, the parties agree that 5 applied. Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. After the General Assembly passed legislation creating the second district, a group of white voters in North Carolina, led by Ruth O. Shaw, sued on the grounds that the district was an unconstitutional gerrymander . In Shaw v. Reno (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court questioned the use of racial gerrymandering in North Carolina's reapportionment plan. A reapportionment statute typically does not classify persons at all; it classifies tracts of land, or addresses. In its 1993 decision, the Supreme Court agreed, ruling that race cannot be the predominant factor in creating districts. The Court extended the reasoning of Gomillion to congressional districting in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964). Pp. Shaw v. Reno Jennifer Denise Rogers . Nothing in the decision precludes white voters (or voters of any other race) from bringing the analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification. Freedom of Speech, Assembly, and Association. facilitating the election of a member of an identifiable group of voters? A reapportionment plan would not be narrowly tailored to the goal of avoiding retrogression if the State went beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression. Subsequent decisions of this Court have similarly interpreted Gomillion as turning on the unconstitutional effect of the legislation. The Court expresses no view on whether appellants successfully could have challenged a district such as that suggested by the Attorney General or whether their complaint stated a claim under other constitutional provisions. O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. Indeed, racial classifications receive close scrutiny even when they may be said to burden or benefit the races equally. We therefore consider what that level of scrutiny requires in the reapportionment context. Post, at 678 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). The Court reasoned: "If these allegations upon a trial remained uncontradicted or unqualified, the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote." It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. To help you find the subject, ask, Who answered? A covered jurisdiction's interest in creating majority-minority districts in order to comply with the nonretrogression rule under 5 of the Voting Rights Act does not give it carte blanche to engage in racial gerrymandering. The Act proved immediately successful in ensuring racial minorities access to the voting booth; by the early 1970's, the spread between black and white registration in several of the targeted Southern States had fallen to well below 10%. In 1993, about 20% of the state population identified as Black. The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. Appellants contended that the General Assembly's revised reapportionment plan violated several provisions of the United States Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment. If it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide adequate representation for rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Americans, or for Republicans, it necessarily follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for members of the very minority group whose history in the United States gave birth to the Equal Protection Clause. A contrary conclusion could only be described as perverse. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. SHAW v. RENO (1993) AP U.S. Government and Politics Study Guide IMPACT The decision in Shaw v. Reno led to nationwide changes after the 2000 Census. We have made clear, however, that equal protection analysis "is not dependent. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 279-280 (1986) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.) The majority, however, accepted the District Court's finding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the districts were in fact drawn on racial lines. A special three-judge district court dismissed the suit against both the attorney general and the state officials. Constitutional Law for a Changing America Resource Center, 13. Congress, too, responded to the problem of vote dilution. Since I do not agree that appellants alleged an equal protection violation and because the Court of Appeals faithfully followed the Court's prior cases, I dissent and would affirm the judgment below. The district lines may be drawn, for example, to provide for compact districts of contiguous territory, or to maintain the integrity of political subdivisions. That it may be difficult to determine from the face of a single-member districting plan that it makes such a distinction does not mean that a racial gerrymander, once established, should receive less scrutiny than other legislation classifying citizens by race. The district even has inspired poetry: "Ask not for whom the line is drawn; it is drawn to avoid thee." Wright is relevant only to the extent that it illustrates a proposition with which I have no problem: that a complaint stating that a plan has carved out districts on the basis of race can, under certain circumstances, state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The first question is easy. 430 U. S., at 167-168 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by STEVENS and REHNQUIST, JJ.). In whatever district, the individual voter has a right to vote in each election, and the election will result in the voter's representation. No.1, 458 U. S. 457, 485 (1982). of Gal. 14, 27-29. Supreme Court rulings in the Shaw v. Reno (1995) and the Shelby County vs. Holder (2013) cases relied heavily on the reasoning behind the passage of the Voting Rights Act (1965). Under the General Assembly's plan, two will vote for congressional representatives in District 12 and three will vote in neighboring District 2. 92-357 Argued: April 20, 1993 Decided: June 28, 1993. Ibid. To comply with 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965-which prohibits a covered jurisdiction from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or . The plaintiffs in UJO-members of a Hasidic community split between two districts under New York's revised redistricting plan-did not allege that the plan, on its face, was so highly irregular that it rationally could be understood only as an effort to segregate voters by race. 42 U. S. C. 1973; see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986) (applying amended 2 to vote-dilution claim involving multimember districts); see also Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S. 146, 155 (1993) (single-member districts). As UJO held, a State is entitled to take such action. 7, that included a second majority-black district. to Juris. A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. The duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power over the electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group. See post, at 684 (dissenting opinion). Of particular relevance, five of the Justices reasoned that members of the white majority could not plausibly argue that their influence over the political process had been unfairly canceled, see id., at 165-168 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by REHNQUIST and STEVENS, JJ. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for federal appellees. More importantly, the majority's submission does not withstand analysis. Our focus is on appellants' claim that the State engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. The facts of this case mirror those presented in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977) (UJO), where the Court rejected a claim that creation of a majority-minority district violated the Constitution, either as a per se matter or in light of the circumstances leading to the creation of such a district. 808 F. The case established that any legislative redistricting must be strictly scrutinized and that any laws related to racially motivated redistricting must be held to narrow standards and This case involves two of the most complex and sensitive issues this Court has faced in recent years: the meaning of the constitutional "right" to vote, and the propriety of racebased state legislation designed to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups. They did not even claim to be white. But it suffices to illustrate the unworkability of a standard that is divorced from any measure of constitutional harm. Docket no. They sought similar relief against the federal appellees, arguing, alternatively, that the federal appellees had misconstrued the Voting Rights Act or that the Act itself was unconstitutional. The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. The Court today chooses not to overrule, but rather to sidestep,UJO. 808 F. Supp. taker's concurrence appears to be premised on the notion that black citizens were being "fenc[ed] out" of municipal benefits. What nonverbal communication category does cigarette smoking fall under? See 364 U. S., at 341, 346. Appellants alleged not that the revised plan constituted a political gerrymander, nor that it violated the "one person, one vote" principle, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 558 (1964), but that the State had created an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. At some points the district was no wider than Interstate 85, prompting one state legislator to remark that if "you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district." In particular, they have no bearing on whether the plan ultimately is found to violate the Constitution. ("United Jewish Organizations properly is viewed as a case in which the remedy for an administrative finding of discrimination encompassed measures to improve the previously disadvantaged group's ability to participate, without excluding individuals belonging to any other group from enjoyment of the relevant opportunity-meaningful participation in the electoral process") (emphasis added). 808 F. 430 U. S., at 162-163 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ.) It may be that the terms for pleading this cause of action will be met so rarely that this case will wind up an aberra-. ); see also post, at 662-663 (opinion of WHITE, J.). shape of the district lines could "be explained only in racial terms." Centered in the northeast portion of the State, it moves southward until it tapers to a narrow band; then, with finger-like extensions, it reaches far into the southernmost part of the State near the South Carolina border. An understanding of the nature of appellants' claim is critical to our resolution of the case. Wright involved a challenge to a legislative plan that created four districts. The State has made no mystery of its intent, which was to respond to the Attorney General's objections, see Brief for State Appellees 13-14, by improving the minority group's prospects of electing a candidate of its choice. In determining whether a use of race is permissible in cases in which there is a bizarrely shaped district, we can readily look to its effects, just as we would in evaluating any other electoral districting scheme. Three Justices rejected the plaintiffs' claim on the grounds that the New York statute "represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other race" and left white voters with better than proportional representation. That duty, however, is not violated when the majority acts to facilitate the election of a member of a group that lacks such power because it remains underrepresented in the state legislature-whether that group is defined by political affiliation, by common economic interests, or by religious, ethnic, or racial characteristics. We have considered the constitutionality of these practices in other Fourteenth Amendment cases and have required plaintiffs to demonstrate that the challenged practice has the purpose and effect of diluting a racial group's voting strength. The North Carolina Republican Party and individual voters brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging that the plan constituted an unconstitutional political gerrymander under Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109 (1986). Id., at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted); id., at 58 (Harlan, J., concurring); id., at 59-62 (Douglas, J., dissenting). "Being aware," in this context, is shorthand for "taking into account," and it hardly can be doubted that legislators routinely engage in the business of making electoral predictions based on group characteristics-racial, ethnic, and the like. The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. Cf. See Personnel Administrator of Mass. 1 See Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830, 848-852 (CA7) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. Ruth Shaw and four other white North Carolina voters filed suit against the U.S. attorney general and various North Carolina officials, claiming that race-based redistricting violated, among other provisions, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. This rule applies as well to a classification that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination. Fast Facts: Shaw v. Reno Case Argued: April 20, 1993 Decision Issued: June 28, 1993 Const., Arndt. Pleading such an element, the Court holds, suffices without a further allegation of harm, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Fourteenth Amendment. 2. See supra, at 680-681. gered at least heightened scrutiny (which every Member of the Court to address the issue has agreed must be applied even to race-based classifications designed to serve some permissible state interest).5 Presumably because the legitimate consideration of race in a districting decision is usually inevitable under the Voting Rights Act when communities are racially mixed, however, and because, without more, it does not result in diminished political effectiveness for anyone, we have not taken the approach of applying the usual standard of such heightened "scrutiny" to race-based districting decisions. Significant changes in the area of redistricting and gerrymandering, 1. North Carolina's decision to create a majority-minority district can be explained as an attempt to meet this objection. Finally, nothing in the Court's highly fractured decision in UJO-on which the District Court almost exclusively relied, and which the dissenters evidently believe controls, see post, at 664-667 (opinion of WHITE, J. 3 The majority does not acknowledge that we require such a showing from plaintiffs who bring a vote dilution claim under 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Of particular relevance, five of the Justices reasoned that members of the white majority could not plausibly argue that their influence over the political process had been unfairly canceled (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by REHNQUIST and STEVENS, J.J.), or that such had been the State's intent (STEWART, J., POWELL, J., concurring in judgment). Appellants further argue that if 2 did require adoption of North Carolina's revised plan, 2 is to that extent unconstitutional. A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. 7 The Court accuses me of treating the use of race in electoral redistricting as a "benign" form of discrimination. Syllabus ; View Case ; Appellant Shaw . BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 676, STEVENS, J., post, p. 676, and SOUTER, J., post, p. 679, filed dissenting opinions. It does so by glossing over the striking similarities, focusing on surface differences, most notably the (admittedly unusual) shape of the newly created district, and imagining an entirely new cause of action. Croson Co.(1989) (city contracting);Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Majority Opinion/Decision. 75-104, p. 6, n. 6) (emphasis in original). What is the purpose of an input device? The Attorney General's interposition of a 5 objection "properly is viewed" as "an administrative finding of discrimination" against a racial minority. In some exceptional cases, a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be. 7 I borrow the term "segregate" from the majority, but, given its historical connotation, believe that its use is ill advised. It deemed appellants' claim under the Fifteenth Amendment essentially subsumed within their related claim under the Equal Protection Clause. The state appellees submit that two pieces of evidence gave the General Assembly a strong basis for believing that remedial action was warranted here: the Attorney General's imposition of the 5 preclearance requirement on 40 North Carolina counties, and the Gingles District Court's findings of a long history of official racial discrimination in North Carolina's political system and of pervasive racial bloc voting. See ante, at 661-663, 669-670.6. 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